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Constitutional Law: Guinn v. Collinsville Church of
Christ: Balancing an Individual's Right to Tort
Compensation and the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses
Protecting individual religious and civil rights and the rights of religious
self-autonomy have caused conflict since the beginning of our country's
history.' The first amendment has provided the Constitutional parameters
for this conflict. 2 The free exercise and establishment clauses have strong
foundations in the social and political history of the United States. Both
clauses have goals of religious independence from civil intervention.
The issue presented in this note is whether individual rights protected
under the civil laws of the United States or the religious authority recognized
by the religion clauses should prevail when they are in conflict. Guinn v.
Collinsville Church of Christ3 explores new frontiers in this dispute while
attempting to balance the rights in question. The Guinn court held that
while a person consents to church membership, church disciplinary proce-
dures are immune from civil adjudication. 4 But once a church member
withdraws from membership, the rights of the individual will prevail whether
the acts were done before or after the withdrawal.5 The better rule would
be to recognize the member's right to withdraw membership and deny the
church jurisdiction over future actions (postwithdrawal acts), but allow the
church to continue its jurisdiction over acts performed while the person was
a member (prewithdrawal acts).
This note will discuss the development of religious liberty and tort claims,
especially invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of mental distress.
This note will also discuss how Guinn further delineates the boundaries
between tortious and nontortious behavior in relation to church discipline
and activities. Finally, alternatives in the balancing equation will be consid-
ered.
Development of Autonomy for Religious Organizations
As one writer stated, "Both the text of the first amendment and the very
nature of democratic pluralism in Western political theory provide strong
arguments for the judicial recognition of a sphere of autonomy for religious
organizations. ' 6 Various religious groups, seeking to avoid religious perse-
1. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1032 (1986) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
2. Id. at 1031.
3. 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989). Chief Justice Hargrave, Vice-Chief Justice Opala, Justices
Lavender, Doolin, and Summers concur; Justices Wilson and Kauger concur in part, dissent
in part; Justices Hodges and Simms dissent.
4. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 774.
5. Id. at 779.
6. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment
Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. Rv. 1, 8 (1986).
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cution in Europe, spearheaded the formation of some colonies in America.
Religious freedom was a central theme in many early Americans' exodus
from Europe to America.7 Yet, as the United States was formed, these
colonial governments gradually separated the civil governing authority from
religious authority.8 The first amendment of the Constitution of the United
States was adopted to protect this separate religious authority. 9 Although
the history is unclear, the colonial governments separated civil and religious
authority, but wanted to ensure religious authority was left to the people
and their religious groups.'0
The fourteenth amendment ensures that the first amendment prohibitions
apply to any state action that abridges religious freedom." As stated by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Guinn, "At its core the First Amendment
shields and protects religious liberties of citizens from both state and federal
governmental interference .... ",12
Supreme Court Rulings Regarding Religious Righ/s
The United States Supreme Court has developed different rules for testing
the constitutionality of various causes of action. If governmental intervention
impairs religious freedom, the Court balances what must be a compelling
governmental interest against the asserted first amendment rights.' 3 The
compelling governmental interest prevails only when there is a clear and
present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public
streets or any other immediate threat to public safety, peace or order. 4
One of the first Supreme Court cases to discuss the role of civil courts
in matters relating to church authority, Watson v. Jones,'" decided who had
the authority to decide matters of religious doctrine, discipline and church
order. The Court held that civil courts have no jurisdiction over purely
ecclesiastical matters.' 6 The Court stated that "whenever the questions of
discipline or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided
by ... church judicatories ... the legal tribunals must accept such decisions
as final, and as binding on them."' 7
7. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 769.
8. Id. at 770.
9. Id. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assembly, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
10. CONSTrruTioNLm LAW at 1032.
11. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
12. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 770.
13. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 387, 403 (1945). See generally
L. TRINE, Ammc AN CoNsTrrUTIONAL LAW 1000 (1978).
14. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308. These factors are commonly referred to as activities that
threaten "public safety, peace, or order." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
15. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 680 (1871).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 727.
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The Watson Court gave three reasons for the separation of civil and
ecclesiastical matters: (1) civil judges are not as well prepared to resolve
questions concerning religious doctrine as ecclesiastical authorities; (2) mem-
bers of religious organizations have voluntarily joined the general church
body, thus giving implied consent to church governance; and (3) our gov-
ernment was designed to severely limit civil encroachment into the affairs
of religious organizations.'"
In the past, the Supreme Court has allowed marginal civil court review
in religious disputes involving "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness."'' 9 Al-
though the arbitrariness exception has been held unconstitutional, 20 the fraud
and collusion exceptions have been used often when fraudulent actions were
used against others in a religious group.
2'
In Everson v. Board of Education,22 the Supreme Court created a pre-
sumption in favor of religion when a conflict with state action occurs. The
Court stated that the wall between church and state "must be kept high
and impregnable.
' 23
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,24 the Supreme Court established a method for
preventing states from infringing on the establishment clause. Although the
18. The Guinn court summarized this policy of legal abstention in ecclesiastical matters as
follows:
If members of religious organizations could freely pursue their doctrinal grievances
in civil courts, or legislatures could pass laws to inhibit or enhance religious
activities, ecclesiastical liberty would be subjected to governmental interference
and the "unmolested and unobstructed" development of opinion and belief which
the First Amendment shield was designed to foster could be secularly undermined.
Guinn, 775 P.2d at 772.
19. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
20. In Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Court called
the arbitrariness exception inconsistent with constitutional mandate.
21. In Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), however, the
Court did not specify how the remaining two are to be applied. In Milivojevich, a bishop of
the American-Canadian diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church was removed from
office during a reorganization of the Church. The organization also affected the control of
church property. The Illinois Supreme Court held for the defrocked bishop, ruling that the
removal was arbitrary. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d 268 (Ill.
1975). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on grounds that the arbitrariness of the
removal involved primarily religious issues of "discipline, faith, internal organization, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom or law." 426 U.S. at 713. Even though the dispute involved church
property, the Court held the case was essentially ecclesiastical in nature and not for civil
adjudication. 426 U.S. at 720.
In Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872), the Court considered whether
expulsion of certain church members was truly an act of the church or an act of a minority
group of members who had no authority to excommunicate others. The Court held the action
by the minority was without authority, thus inoperative. Id. at 140. The Court, however,
acknowledged it had no authority to question ordinary acts of church discipline or membership.
The Court further distinguished its ability to determine whether or not an ecclesiastical body
claiming authority was making a false claim concerning that authority through fraud or
collusion.
22. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1946).
23. Id.
24. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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lack of a statute renders the first two points of the Lemon test moot, 25 the
6xcessive government entanglement prong should still be considered. The
entanglement analysis seems simply to be a balancing of religious and
governmental interests. 26 State laws, whether statutory or common law,
including tort rules, constitute state action which is subject to the constraints
of the first amendment.
27
The Facts and Trial Court Decision in Quinn
The plaintiff, Marian Guinn, and her children moved to Collinsville,
Oklahoma in 1974. She joined the Collinsville Church of Christ and attended
services while the congregation extended financial, emotional and spiritual
help to her. 28 In 1980, defendants Ron Whitten, Ted Moody and Allen Cash
(the "Elders") confronted Guinn with a rumor that she was having sexual
relations with Pat Sharp. According to the Elders, they investigated this
rumor to uphold church doctrine which requires that they confront and
discuss problems with any member who is "having trouble. '29 When Guinn
was confronted with the church's prohibition against fornication, she con-
firmed the truth of the rumor.
The church's code of ethics follows the disciplinary procedure set forth
in Matthew 18:13-17.3o The Elders carried out the Biblically-mandated dis-
25. The Lemon test consists of three prongs:
(1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
(2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and
(3) the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.
Id. at 612-13.
26. CoNsrrrtrmoiAL LAW at 1031 (there is a natural conflict between the two interests that
requires the court to choose between the competing values).
27. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28. The Appellants Brief listed some of the financial and material aid Guinn and her family
received after joining the church: (1) rides to night school to obtain her general education
diploma ("GED"); (2) gifts of two used cars; (3) car insurance payments; (4) payment of her
gas expenses; (5) payment of car repairs after an accident; (6) babysitting services by members
so she could study; (7) a graduation party and gift after she obtained her GED; (8) another
party and cash gift after her graduation from junior college; (9) clothing for her family; and
(10) food from the church pantry. Appellant's Brief in Chief at 6, Guinn v. Collinsville Church
of Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
29. The Church of Christ follows a literal interpretation of the Bible which serves as the
church's sole source of moral, religious and ethical guidance. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 768.
30. Matthew 18:13-17 (King James) states:
And if so be that he find it, verily I say unto you, he rejoiceth more of that
sheep, than of the ninety and nine which went not astray.
Even so it is not the will of your Father which is in heaven, that one of these
little ones should perish.
Moreover, if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault
between thee and him alone, if he shall hear thee, thou has gained thy brother.
But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the
mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established.
And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church; but if he neglect
to hear the church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican.
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NOTES
ciplinary procedure in three "meetings" with Guinn. First, they approached
Guinn and her children in a laundromat and requested that she appear
before the church and repent. Next, the Elders called her from the church
and told her that if she did not come to the church, they would come to
her house. Guinn came to the church and was told to stop seeing her lover.
She agreed because the relationship was deteriorating.
The final meeting was in the driveway outside Guinn's house. The Elders
approached her and stated if she did not appear before the congregation
and repent, the members would "withdraw fellowship" from her.31 A few
days later, the Elders sent a letter confirming this procedure.
When Guinn realized that the Elders intended to inform the congregation
of her sexual involvement with Sharp, she had her attorney advise the Elders
not to expose Guinn's private life to the congregation. Guinn also wrote
the Elders, asking them not to mention her name in church except to tell
the congregation that she had withdrawn from membership.
The Elders ignored both requests and read their letter to Guinn to the
congregation. They advised the congregation to contact Guinn and to lov-
ingly encourage her to repent and return to the Church. The Elders also
told the congregation that should their attempts fail, the violated scriptures
would be read aloud at the next service and withdrawal of fellowship
proceedings would begin.
Guinn met with one of the Elders and again asked that the information
be kept from the congregation. The Elder told her that withdrawing from
membership in the Church of Christ was not only doctrinally impossible,
but also would not stop the church's disciplinary sanction against her.
32
Subsequently, the pastor read the scriptures that Guinn had violated to
the congregation. In accordance with the church's disciplinary process, the
church sent the same information to four other area Church of Christ
congregations to be read aloud during services. The Collinsville Church of
Christ sponsored the other four congregations.
Guinn brought an action against the church claiming intentional infliction
of emotional distress ("outrage") and invasion of privacy ("publication of
private facts").33 Guinn claimed the Elders unreasonably publicized her
31. Withdrawal of fellowship is a disciplinary procedure by the congregation. When a
member has violated the church code of ethics and refuses to repent, the elders read the
violated Biblical scriptures to the congregation. The congregation then withdraws fellowship
by refusing to acknowledge the person. The church believes this serves two purposes. First, it
causes the transgressor to feel lonely and thus desire repentance and fellowship with other
members. Second, it ensures that the church and members continue to be free from sin and
serve the Lord. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 768 n.2.
32. The Church of Christ believes that all its members are a family. One can be born into
the family, but can never truly withdraw from it. The church believes one can voluntarily join
the church's flock, but cannot then disassociate oneself from it. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 769.
33. The Elders' commission of the tort of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional
distress was found to have caused her severe emotional distress and shock, especially because
the Elders publicized the parishioner's conduct in the presence of her minor children. The
invasion of privacy claim involved two theories: (1) unjust intrusion upon her seclusion; and
(2) publication of private facts with intent to damage her reputation and expose her to public
1989]
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private life to the Church of Christ congregations.14 The disciplinary meas-
ures listed in her complaint included church actions before and after she
had resigned her membership (prewithdrawal and postwithdrawal acts). The
Elders moved for summary judgment, but the trial court submitted the case
to the jury which awarded Guinn actual and punitive damages."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court Decision - Disciplinary Actions
Against Guinn Before She Withdrew Membership
Did Not Justify State Interference.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of summary
judgment for actions taken by the Elders while Guinn was still a member
of the church.36 The court held that, generally, no civil cause of action can
be brought against religious authorities for disciplinary actions while a
person is a member of that religious group."7 The court noted that Guinn
was aware of the withdrawal of fellowship procedure and knew what it
entailed because she had witnessed a previous procedure."8
The court held that civil adjudication of disciplinary procedures conducted
while the person was a member of the church was a burden on the free
exercise of religion. 39 The court used the test established in Cantwell v. State
of Connecticut40 and Sherbert v. Verner4l and found that the Church of
Christ's doctrines posed no serious threat to public safety, health or wel-
fare. 4
2
The court stated that under the first amendment, individuals may freely
consent to be spiritually governed by rules determined and enforced by
those chosen as religious leaders a.4 The court followed the implied consent
theory established in Watson that stated that once a member joins a church,
the member consents to the authority of that religious body." Guinn's
submission to church authority and the Elders' reliance on that submission
"collectively shielded the church's prewithdrawal, religiously-motivated dis-
contempt. Guinn originally sought damages for defamation but dropped the cause of action
due to a defense of truth. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 769 n.3.
34. Guinn also claimed the religious disciplinary measures were highly offensive, unreason-
able and intrusive. Id. at 769.
35. The parties stipulated that the Elders were at all times acting as agents of the Church
of Christ corporation. Judgment was levied against the Elders and the Collinsville Church of
Christ. The jury awarded $205,000 in actual and $185,000 in punitive damages. The court
then added $44,737 in prejudgment interest. Id.
36. Id. at 775.
37. Id. at 774.
38. Id. at 768 n.2.
39. Id. at 774.
40. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
41. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
42. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 774.
43. Id.
44. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871).
[Vol. 42
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cipline from scrutiny through secular judicature. ' 45 Because the trial court
did not allocate the award of damages between prewithdrawal acts and
postwithdrawal acts, the supreme court remanded the case for a determi-
nation consistent with its ruling.
46
Withdrawal of Church Membershio Removes Church Jurisdiction
The Elders defended actions taken after Guinn left the church on the
grounds that there is no doctrinal provision for withdrawal of membership.
According to their beliefs, a member remains part of the Christian family
for life. The Elders asserted that the court's determination-that Guinn had
effectively withdrawn her membership and consent to church doctrine-was
a usurpation of their religious doctrine.47 The Elders argued that the court's
recognition of Guinn's withdrawal was an example of the civil encroachment
into theological doctrine that courts have specifically tried to avoid.
4
1
However, the first amendment protects individuals' right to worship as
they choose, not as a religious denomination determines. Inherent in the
right to worship is the right not to worship. Failure to recognize a right to
withdrawal would permanently tie individuals to one religious faith regard-
less of their beliefs.
In his dissent Justice Hodges, joined by Justice Simms, found that joining
a church necessitates finding a prohibition of legal actions against the church
following doctrinal beliefs, even after the member withdraws. 49 The dissent
stated: "This Court's review of the Church's doctrine of lifetime membership
and moral discipline is precisely the kind of action the Constitution for-
bids."5 0 Furthermore, the dissent5l noted that a member can withdraw
membership anytime the member chooses, but "the Elders of the Church
may after [the member's] withdrawal continue to believe that [the member]
is a member for life and invoke their disciplinary actions against [the
member] in conformity with their tenets and doctrines."
'52
The majority decision, on the other hand, recognized an individual's right
of self-determination. If the court ignored a member's right to withdraw,
the courts would violate the free exercise clause by elevating a church's
45. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 774.
46. Id. at 775. The court noted that there may be some religiously motivated, consensual
acts which could constitute a threat to public safety, peace or order great enough to require
civil court action. The record, however, showed no such factors, and Guinn could not possibly
recover on retrial for prewithdrawal acts. Id.
47. Id. at 776.
48. See supra notes at 4-22 and accompanying text.
49. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 794, 796 (Hodges, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Justice Kauger disagreed with the majority opinion's holding that the trial court should
have granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment for prewithdrawal acts. She held
that, although a presumption exists that Guinn consented to all church doctrine, it should be
rebuttable. Therefore, the court should not have directed a motion for summary judgment,
but remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 787.
52. Id. at 796 (Hodges, J., dissenting).
1989]
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authority over the individual's freedom of self-determination. This elevation
of church authority would permanently establish a religion for that individ-
ual.
The Elders further asserted that because disciplinary proceedings against
Guinn had already begun, her withdrawal could not hinder the church
proceedings under the first amendment. However, the court ruled that just
as freedom to worship is protected by the first amendment, so also is the
liberty to "recede from one's religious allegiance." 3
Both the majority decision and the dissent of Justice Wilson discussed
the requirements for withdrawal of membership. The majority seemed to
require a formal written withdrawal before a parishioner is relieved from
the authority of a religious organization. The majority stated that Guinn's
withdrawal was "effective not later than upon the Elders' receipt of her
resignation letter." 54 Justice Wilson, however, argued that the withdrawal
was effective once it was orally given and that no written resignation was
required.5 5 But whether the withdrawal was effective when orally given to
the Elders or upon receipt of the written resignation, the majority of the
court nevertheless held that, upon withdrawal, Guinn had a cause of action
against the Elders and the church.1
6
Church Acts After Guinn Withdrew - Were They
Outside the Purview of First Amendment Protection?
The court held that after Guinn unequivocally withdrew her membership,
the "exposure of her private life, done without her consent, was unprotected
by the first amendment. ' 5 7 The Elders and church argued that the trial
court's actions violated not only the first amendment, but also Oklahoma's
constitutional guaranty of religious liberty." The majority did not specifically
address the state religious liberty issue.59
The Guinn court, relying on statements in Madsen v. Erwin,60 held that
first amendment protection does not extend to all religiously motivated
practices. In Madsen, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that clergy-
men may not use the first amendment as a shield to defame a person,
intentionally inflict serious emotional harm on a parishioner or commit
other torts.6' However, in Madsen, the court did not allow damages.
53. Comment, Religious Torts: Applying the Consent Doctrine as Definitional Balancing,
19 U.C. DAvis L. Rv. 949, 974-79 (1986), cited in 775 P.2d at 776.
54. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 777 n.43.
55. Id. at 791 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 778.
57. Id.
58. OKIA. CONST. art. I, § 2, cited in Appellant's Brief at 41.
59. Justice Kauger addressed the Oklahoma constitutional guaranty of religious liberty of
article 1, section 2 and stated that she would have specifically affirmed the jury verdict on
this provision. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 788 (Kauger, J., dissenting).
60. 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985).
61. Id. at 1167.
[Vol. 42
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Madsen, a church member and employee, brought suit against the First
Church of Christ, Scientist of Boston for wrongful discharge and various
other torts allegedly committed when she was fired from her job at the
Christian Science Monitor. She alleged that her employment was terminated
because of her sexual preferences and her refusal to seek healing from the
church. The Madsen court followed the theory of ecclesiastical abstention
developed by the United States Supreme Court in Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Dioceses, v. Milivojevich62 and held that the church's decision to terminate
her employment was a religious decision which the court could not consti-
tutionally adjudicate.
63
The Elders contended that the information was revealed to the Collinsville
congregation in the context of a sermon. The United States Supreme Court,
in Fowler v. Rhode Island,6 specifically held that the contents of a sermon
are not within the jurisdiction of civil courts because to approve or regulate
a sermon would prefer one religion over another, and therefore, the Court
should abstain from such matters. 65 Furthermore, in Simpson v. Wells-
Lamont Corp.,6 the Fifth Circuit held that statements made in church are
not actionable in civil cases.67 Although not explicitly stated, the Guinn
court did not find these two cases to be controlling.
The Guinn court distinguished a Ninth Circuit decision that was based
on similar facts. In Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New
York,6 s a Jehovah's Witness became disillusioned with the church and was
warned of the potential sanction of "disfellowship ' 69 for falling to accept
church practices. The member submitted a written withdrawal of member-
ship and moved to another state. Several years later when she visited her
old neighborhood, her Jehovah's Witness friends would not speak to her
because the church had instructed them to shun 0 all "withdrawn" members.
Paul sued the church claiming that the church had defamed her, caused
her severe emotional distress and invaded her privacy. Following the trial
court's ruling for the defendants, the Ninth Circuit noted that while the
shunning was intentional, it was not "malum in se."171 The court noted that
62. 426 U.S. 696 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). The Madsen Court, recognizing
civil jurisdiction in some limited instances, did allow the plaintiff to replead her remaining
tort claims against the church.
63. Madsen, 481 N.E.2d at 1166.
64. 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
65. Id. at 70.
66. 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. Id. at 492. The dismissed minister brought a civil action based in tort. The federal
district court entered a motion for summary judgment for the defendants and was affirmed
by the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the church is a sanctuary,
if one exists anywhere, immune from the rule or subjection to the authority of the civil courts,
either state or federal, by virtue of the First Amendment." 494 F.2d at 493.
68. 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 289 (1987).
69. "Disfellowshipped persons" are simply former members who have been excommuni-
cated from the church.
70. Shunning is defined as: "To avoid deliberately and especially habitually." WEBsTER's
NEw COLLEGIAT DICTIONARY 1092 (1987).
71. 819 F.2d at 878.
19891
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shunning is not illegal per se in the state of Washington, but could impede
three general state-protected interests. 72 The court held that the defendant
church possessed an affirmative defense of privilege that permitted the
church to engage in shunning pursuant to its religious beliefs without
suffering tort liability.73 Therefore, the court recognized the acts as tortious,
but allowed a defense of privilege. 74
The Paul court held that the imposition of tort damages on the Jehovah's
Witnesses for engaging in the religious practice of shunning would constitute
a direct burden on religion. 75 The court, quoting Langford v. United States,
76
stated that permitting prosecution of a tort, while not criminalizing the
conduct, would make shunning an "unlawful act." ' 77 Therefore, imposing
tort liability for shunning would "have the same effect as prohibiting the
practice and would compel the church to abandon part of its religious
teachings."s
7
The Paul court also cited Sherbert v. Verner79 which expressed disapproval
of state action which imposed a fine against "appellant for her Saturday
worship." In Sherbert, what the Court termed a "fine" was only a denial
of public benefits; in Guinn, the "fine" amounts to actual money damages. s0
The doctrinal development after Sherbert distinguished regulations that
directly burden religion and regulations that only indirectly burden religion.',
The Paul court disregarded the distinction.82 Although the shunning occurred
after Paul had withdrawn her membership, the court made no distinction
between the church's prewithdrawal acts and postwithdrawal acts.
83
In Paul, the court held that shunning did not constitute a sufficient threat
to the peace, safety, or morality of the community as to warrant state
intervention. 4 "Only in extreme and unusual cases has the imposition of a
72. The court noted that certain interests protected by the state might be invaded when
shunning occurs. 819 F.2d at 878. See also Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d
105, 107 (Pa. 1975) (court stating that shunning could interfere with state concerns such as
the maintenance of marriage and family relationships, alienation of affection and result in the
tortious interference with a business relationship).
73. Paul, 819 F.2d at 879.
74. This approach was used instead of negating the plaintiff's cause of action itself, i.e.,
ruling that the conduct in question was not tortious. Id.
75. The court ruled that the Washington and United States constitutions were identical and
based its conclusion on both. Id. at 879-80.
76. 101 U.S. 341, 345 (1879).
77. Paul, 819 F.2d at 881.
78. Id.
79. 374 U.S. 389 (1945).
80. Paul, 819 F.2d at 882.
81. Id.
82. The Paul court found that the direct/indirect distinction of determining religious burden
was not determinative. The court, instead, looked at the effect of the regulation on the free
exercise of religion. Id. at 882 n.6.
83. The Guinn court specifically noted its displeasure with the Paul court's failure to
distinguish the two categories of acts. 775 P.2d at 781. The Paul court stated churches are
afforded great latitude "when they impose discipline on members or former members." 819
F.2d at 883 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
[Vol. 42
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direct burden on religion been upheld ... Offense to someone's sensibilities
resulting from religious conduct is simply not actionable in tort. '" 5 The
dissenting opinion in Guinn followed the Paul holding that civil courts do
not have jurisdiction over tort claims against religious organizations unless
there is a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.
Although the Guinn court stated that the Paul facts are "clearly distin-
guishable" from Guinn,s6 distinguishing the two cases is difficult. The Guinn
court characterized the Elders' postresignation conduct in Paul as passive,
while labeling church activities in Guinn more active and direct. However,
an analysis of both churches' activities reveals that the "shunning" and
"disfellowshipping" procedures are similar.
Both are religiously-based disciplinary procedures instituted by the re-
spective congregations. 7 Once a member is found to have rejected church
policy, the congregations begin a process of separating the church from the
wayward member."' Both procedures involve telling the congregations that
the individual has chosen not to follow church doctrine, and that members
should contact the wayward member to encourage acceptance of church
doctrine. If the individual continues to reject church doctrine, members are
told not to associate with the individual.
Furthermore, both procedures have dual purposes. First, the procedure
pressures the member to repent and accept church doctrine because the
separation creates a longing for the estranged friends. Second, the procedure
serves as an example of the repercussions of not following church doctrine.
In Guinn, the court discussed several facts that could be considered
distinguishing factors. However, none are very convincing. One distinction
was that the congregation in Guinn informed the four other area Church
of Christ congregations of Guinn's activities.8 9 However, most churches
consider other congregations merely other members of the same family of
religious believers, so this distinction seems minute. 90
Another claimed distinction was that the church in Paul passively excluded
Paul and did nothing else.9' According to the Guinn court, the passive
discipline was "vastly different" from the Guinn churches' disciplinary
procedures, which are designed to "control and involve." 92 Although some
may consider shunning less threatening than the withdrawal of fellowship,
85. Id.
86. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 780.
87. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 793; Paul, 819 F.2d at 879.
88. Id.
89. The court left unanswered whether Guinn would have had a cause of action if the
church had told the other congregations about her acts while she was still a member.
90. The congregational theory that all members are part of the same religious family might
prevent a cause of action. Other facts important in the analysis would be that the other
congregations had been sponsored by the Collinsville Church of Christ. Also, Guinn and her
children had received financial aid as well as spiritual aid, and it is not uncommon for people
to seek financial aid from a church, eventually be kicked out, and then go to other neighboring
congregations seeking financial handouts.
91. 775 P.2d at 780.
92. 775 P.2d at 781.
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Paul felt her rights had been violated. Furthermore, the shunning that Paul
received was just as emotionally traumatic as Guinn being labeled a forni-
cator. Some might consider shunning less offensive, but both torts made
the victims feel wronged. In reality, there is little, if any, distinction between
the two procedures.
Reigious Groups Should Continue to Have Jurisdiction
Over Prewithdrawal Acts
The distinction between prewithdrawal acts and postwithdrawal acts has
merit. As discussed above,9 members negate their consent to church au-
thority when they withdraw. Unfortunately, the Guinn decision interfered
with religious jurisdiction in another way. An analogy to a criminal scenario
is useful. If a person commits a crime in Oklahoma, that person, by moving
his domicile to Texas, does not remove jurisdiction from Oklahoma. Okla-
homa courts would continue to have jurisdiction.
The Guinn decision gives individuals the ability to remove a religious
matter from the jurisdiction of religious authorities when they could not do
the same outside religious matters. The Guinn court was correct to hold
that the church has jurisdiction over acts while the person is a member.
However, the church should continue to have jurisdiction over acts com-
mitted before the member resigned, just as Oklahoma retains jurisdiction
in the above hypothetical. As Oklahoma has a legitimate interest in adju-
dicating actions committed while the individual was in Oklahoma, the church
continues to have an interest in actions committed by the individual while
a 'member of the church, regardless of whether the individual remains a
member.
As mentioned, there are three reasons for disciplinary procedures: (1) to
encourage the member to repent by withholding the friendship of the
congregation; (2) to help rid the church of the sin and serve as an example
of church policy and discipline; and (3) to prevent the member from
rejoining the membership before the member has repented.9 4 The third reason
supports telling other congregations of the member's prewithdrawal actions.
This prevents the member from merely switching congregations. The Guinn
court imposed a burden on the church by preventing it from following
church doctrine and achieving these goals.
Allowing the church continued jurisdiction over prewithdrawal actions
even after members resign clearly leaves members free to choose and change
their church affiliation. Once the member withdraws, the church, of course,
would not have authority to discipline the member for acts done after
withdrawal. However, the church should still have authority to adjudicate
prewithdrawal acts. Because the church must be able to set an example for
other members and also prevent the withdrawn member from coming back
93. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
94. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 793; Paul, 819 F.2d at 879.
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without repenting, clearly this solution is more effective in balancing the
competing interests of the individual and the church.
The Guinn court discussed Redgate v. Roush9 in which a Church of
Christ member, sometimes serving as pastor, sued the elders of a Wilming-
ton, Kansas Church of Christ for defamation. The elders had withdrawn
fellowship from him and circulated articles in the church paper warning of
his unworthiness as a member and pastor because he had preached against
church doctrine. The elders defended their decision to publish the article on
the grounds that the information legitimately concerned their congrega-
tions. 96 The Kansas Supreme Court held the Elders had a "qualified privi-
lege" to communicate the reasons for the disciplinary proceedings because
of the congregation's interest.
97
The Guinn court distinguished Redgate because Guinn was no longer a
church member while the plaintiff in Redgate attempted to continue preach-
ing as a member of the denomination. While Guinn's withdrawal is relevant,
it should not be determinative because if the church could not discipline
her for her prewithdrawal acts, nothing would stop her from rejoining in
the future. Therefore, the Collinsville congregation was justified in notifying
other nearby congregations.
It is important to note certain language in Redgate:
If ... [Redgate] was unworthy or unfit to discharge the sacred
functions of his high calling, the ... [Elders], interested in the
welfare of the denomination throughout the land, would appear
to have been justified in warning other members and congrega-
tions of that organization to whom the plaintiff [Redgate] might
offer his services as pastor.98
One could attempt to distinguish the cases because Redgate involved a
paid pastor. However, Guinn had obtained financial support and could do
so again if her transgression were not publicized. Therefore, the similar
financial dangers outweigh the distinction.
Were the Constitutional Rights of Free Speech
and Freedom of Association Violated?
Although not discussed in the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision, the
Elders and the Church argued that the trial court's decision violated their
rights of free speech and association." In Widmar v. Vincent, 100 the United
States Supreme Court held that religious speech, including dissemination of
95. 61 Kan. 480, 59 P. 1050 (1900).
96. Id. at 1051.
97. Id. at 1050.
98. Id. at 1051.
99. Appellant's Brief at 36; Reply Brief of Appellants at 22, Guinn v. Collinsville Church
of Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
100. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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religious views and doctrine to nonbelievers, is constitutionally protected
from governmental infringement.
In Widmar, the University of Missouri at Kansas City, a state-supported
university, made its facilities generally available to registered student groups.
The University, however, denied a registered student religious group's re-
quest to use the facilities. The denial was based on University regulations
which prohibited the use of University facilities for religious worship or
teaching.
Members of the group brought suit and alleged that the denial violated
their rights of free exercise and speech. The Court ruled that the University
regulations were not content-neutral and therefore invalid. 1 1 Applying the
Lemon test under the establishment clause, the Court found that the regu-
lation inhibited religion.'02
The state must show a compelling governmental interest before limiting
such speech.10 1 In Widmar, the Court held that the principle of separation
of church and state was insufficient to justify governmental infringement
of protected religious speech.' 4 Although not stating so specifically, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court seemed to agree with this principle in regard to
statements made before Guinn withdrew. However, the court's ruling that
all speech after withdrawal can be tortious violates the Widmar holding.
Furthermore, because the court allowed damages, especially punitive dam-
ages, the decision chills constitutionally protected speech.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the first and fourteenth amend-
ments guarantee the freedom to associate for religious purposes. lO The
Court also stated, in Widmar, that gathering to engage in religious worship
is a form of association protected by the first amendment."0 The Elders
and church argued that their conduct is protected because they would be
unable to carry out disciplinary measures without the freedom to meet and
associate.1 7 They argued the disciplinary meetings would be curtailed, if
not halted, by churches being punished through actual and punitive dam-
ages.108 But after the Guinn decision, these disciplinary meetings would only
be curtailed to the extent that they occur after a member has withdrawn
membership. In summary, the Guinn decision seems to conflict with the
Widmar holding that protects freedom of association and religious speech.
Establishing the Tort of Invasion
of Privacy - Publication of Private Facts
Because the Guinn court found the postwithdrawal acts of the church
outside first amendment protection, it allowed recovery for the tort of
101. Id. at 263.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 276.
105. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
106. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
107. Appellant's Brief at 39-40.
108. Id.
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"outrage," also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
Guinn court also allowed recovery for the tort of "publication of private
facts," an offspring of the tort of invasion of privacy.0 9 The elements of
these torts are governed by Eddy v. Brown"0 and McCormack v. Oklahoma
Publishing Co."' To prove publication of private facts, Guinn had to show
that the Elders' statements (1) were highly offensive to a reasonable person,
(2) contained private facts about parishioner's life, (3) were a public disclo-
sure of private facts and (4) were not of legitimate concern to the Church
of Christ congregation.' 12
The Elders contended that Guinn failed to establish several elements.
First, the Elders argued that there was no public disclosure because only
members of the Church of Christ were told of Guinn's actions. Applying
the definition of "publicity" as stated in Eddy,113 the Guinn court reasoned
that "[tihis group of people constitutes, in many respects, Parishioner's
public. '1 1 4 However, the court's reasoning seems flawed because Guinn
voluntarily joined this group and consented to its procedures which include
disclosure to the members. The disclosure to the congregation should not
be considered a "public" disclosure. Extensive discussion of this point is
beyond the scope of this note.
The Elders also contended that Guinn did not establish that the statements
were not of legitimate concern. The court cited Redgate and held that
because Guinn had removed herself from the congregation and was no
threat of adverse influence on the church, the information was of no
legitimate concern to the congregation." 5 However, the court's rationale
ignores the second of the multiple purposes of church disciplinary proce-
dures, that the church does have an interest in removing sin from the church
and setting an example for other members.
Establishing the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Breeden v. League Services Corp.,116 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopted Section 46, Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement (Sec-
109. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 782-83. See also RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 652B comment
d (1977).
110. 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986).
111. 613 P.2d 737 (Okla. 1980). This decision, as well as Eddy v. Brown, governs invasion
of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
112. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 781.
113. The court stated that:
"Publicity" means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the
public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge... The difference is
not one of the means of communication... [but] one of a communication that
reaches, or is sure to reach the public.
Eddy, 715 P.2d at 78.
114. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 781.
115. Id. at 782.
116. 575 P.2d 1374 (Okla. 1978).
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ond)") for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court stated:
"Because of the fear of fictitious and or trivial claims ... the law has been
slow to afford independent protection to the interest of freedom from
emotional distress standing alone." 1 7 The Restatement requires extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causing severe emotional dis-
tress to another."8
The Elders argued that there was no evidence to support a finding of
extreme and outrageous conduct against Guinn. Considering Guinn admitted
that the Elders were "kind" in every meeting, and the disciplinary procedure
was doctrinally based, the court's decision to uphold the finding of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was factually unsound. Although many
people might not agree with the church's procedures, it is unlikely that
many would say that the activities go beyond all decency in a civilized
society. The Elders argued that the court's finding such factual information
to be outrageous would be tantamount to eliminating a religious organiza-
tion's ability to discipline its members or to enforce doctrinal standards." 9
There are several factors that seem to erode the court's finding that the
church actions were sufficiently outrageous. First, worshippers have followed
the practice of disfellowshipping or shunning since the time of Christ.120
Second, most Christian denominations have similar procedures.' 2, Third,
both Guinn and Sharp admitted to the truth of the affair. Fourth, there
are no other reasonable alternatives to telling the membership as a whole.
Of course, one could argue that there is no need for the church to
mention her name or, at least, her actions. But falling to recognize the
transgressions would defeat the church policy of disfellowshipping and
encouraging of repentance. If church members are unaware of who is to
be disfellowshipped, or what actions caused the disfellowshipping, the pro-
cedure will fail. The fifth factor that erodes the court's finding of outrageous
Church actions is that Guinn had witnessed the withdrawal of fellowship
procedure in the congregations before. Sixth, even before the church pro-
ceeding, the affair was common knowledge throughout the town. In sum-
mary, the existence of the numerous rational purposes for the church
discipline should prevent the establishment of "outrageous conduct" as
required for the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress.122
117. Id. at 1376.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Comment d to Section 46 requires the
conduct to be so extreme that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency to be regarded
atrocious and intolerable in a civilized community.
119. Appellant's Brief at 49.
120. See 1 Corinthians 5:9, 5:11; 2 John 11; 2 Thessalonians 3, 14. See Esbeck, Tort Claims
Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89 W.
VA. L. REv. 1 (1986).
121. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment
Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1986).
122. The court did not specifically state how serious it considered the actions of informing
the other congregations compared to informing the Collinsville congregation. The interesting
question of how the jury, trial court and appellate courts would have treated the case if the
other congregations had not been involved was left unanswered.
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Qualifed Privileges
The Elders argued that even if Guinn established the torts, there existed
a qualified or conditional privilege that precluded liability.'2 A qualified,
privileged communication is one which is made in good faith upon a topic
in which the party has an interest or a topic in which the party has a duty
to a person with a corresponding duty or interest.124 The Restatement
(Second) section 652G, specifically recognizes a qualified privilege to inva-
sion of privacy. Section 596 of the Restatement (Second), and specifically
comment e of 596, addresses the case at bar.'?'
The Elders argued that all members of the church had a common interest
in Guinn's activities. However, the court held that there was no conditional
privilege because the congregation had no concern for the sins of a person
who is no longer a member. 26 However, this reasoning totally ignores the
church's equally compelling need for a disciplinary process.
Are Punitive Damages Appropriate in Tort Actions
Against Religious Organizations?
Even assuming that actual or consequential damages are appropriate for
religious tortfeasors, punitive damages should not have been permitted. The
Elders made a convincing argument that there was no evidence in the record
to support a finding that the Elders were motivated by malice or an evil
intent as required by Oklahoma statute. 27 In Paul v. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Society of New York,12 1 the Ninth Circuit specifically found that
shunning was intentional, but not malem in se, 129 and therefore denied
punitive damages.
123. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 784.
124. Tuohy v. Halsell, 35 Okla. 61, 128 P. 126 (1912).
125. R.STATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 596 (1965), entitled "Common Interest," provides
that:
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances
lead any one of several persons having a common interest in a particular subject
matter correctly or reasonably to believe that there is information that another
sharing the common interest is entitled to know.
Comment e to section 596, entitled "Members of religious, fraternal and charitable associa-
tions," provides, in pertinent part, that:
The common interest of members of religious associations, whether incorporated
or unincorporated ... is recognized as sufficient to support a privilege for
communications among themselves concerning the qualifications of the officers
and members and their participation in the activities of the society. This is true
whether the defamatory matter relates to alleged misconduct of some other
member that makes him undesirable for continued membership, or the conduct
of a prospective member. So too, the rule is applicable to communications between
members and officers of the organization concerning the legitimate conduct of
the activities for which it is organized.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 comment e (1965) (emphasis added).
126. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 782.
127. See 23 OrIA. STAT. § 9 (Supp. 1986).
128. See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
129. "Malem in se" is defined as "a wrong in itself." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 865 (5th
ed. 1979).
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In Guinn, the trial record clearly showed a doctrinally-based rationale for
the Elders' actions. Furthermore, Guinn admitted that the Elders acted with
"kindness" during their meetings.130 The letter from the church to Guinn
was also void of any malice toward Guinn and her family. As Justice Wilson
stated in her dissent, all the evidence seemed to show that the Elders were
acting in what they considered a scriptural disciplinary proceeding.' 3 ' "In
first amendment religious freedom cases punitive damages may not be
imposed upon defendants unless evidence of actual or implied malice is
tendered.' 132
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,133 the United States Supreme Court stated that
any redress, if permitted, must be the least burdensome possible. Punitive
damages are extremely burdensome. Even if conseqlential damages are
granted, the award of punitive damages violates this standard.
The award of punitive damages punishes believers for the exercise of
religion and is obviously a deterrent to others. This deterrent is a major
civil encroachment into religious affairs. Awarding punitive damages is a
direct burden on religion and is contrary to the religion clauses which
requires the government to maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor
opposing religion. The Elders also argued that the punitive damage award
constituted a prior restraint and had a chilling effect on free speech and
religious practices which Cantwell v. Connecticut prohibited.
3 4
However, the Guinn court implicitly found these arguments unpersuasive
and awarded the punitive damages determined by the jury.
Conclusion
The Guinn decision addresses a difficult situation of protecting individual
rights while attempting to protect first amendment interests. The majority
decision makes it clear that while persons are members of a religious
organization, they are subject to that organization's authority. However,
once members withdraw, the religious body loses all jurisdiction, and the
civil courts are free to adjudicate tort claims. This decision totally ignores
both established precedent and the interests of the church.
A better approach would be to allow civil court jurisdiction over all
postwithdrawal acts, but allow the religious organization to continue to
adjudicate prewithdrawal acts even after the member has withdrawn. Because
the person chose to join the religious body, these prewithdrawal acts were
under the consensual authority of the religious body. The group has a
legitimate right to practice doctrinally mandated disciplinary procedures that
also serve the legitimate church objectives. This approach better balances
130. Appellant's Brief at 63.
131. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 791 (Wilson, J., dissenting). Justice Wilson stated that the standard
by which this mens rea element must be measured is whether the conduct of the defendant
exceeded the scope of the doctrinal tenets of the church. Id.
132. Id. at 791-92.
133. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
134. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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the competing interests for two reasons. First, the individual continues to
possess the right to choose a particular religion and the right to withdraw.
Once membership is withdrawn, the religious body has no jurisdiction over
future acts. Second, this approach leaves the religious organization free to
practice its doctrine and fulfill religious discipline and beliefs. Adoption of
this approach would protect the policies behind the first amendment and
the rights of the individual.
Under the tort of publication of private facts, there was no public
disclosure because the church members should not have been considered
third persons constituting the "public," and the congregations had legitimate
concerns. Under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
Elders' actions were not "outrageous" and beyond all bounds of decency.
Therefore, damages should not have been awarded.
Guinn allowed punitive damages to be awarded against the church elders.
Because there was no evidence of malice or an evil intent, punitive damages
should not have been allowed. In addition, punitive damages violate every
standard of neutrality under the establishment clause and are a substantial
burden on religion.
David K. Ratcliff
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